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VS. 
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) Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) 
and (f) (1953, as amended) . This appeal is taken under 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code 
Annotated Sections 77-1-6(g) and Section 78-4-11, (1953, as 
amended), and under Rule 26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING 
THE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SPEEDY 
TRIAL. 
The Standard of Review is a "correction of 
error" standard. (See State v. Johnson. 771 
P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989). 
B. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO 
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF ASSAULT BY A 
PRISONER, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, APPLYING 
THE STANDARD OF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The standard of review is "whether there is 
any reasonable interpretation of the State's 
1 
evidence when viewed from the State's point 
of view that supports a finding of guilt." 
State v. Myers. 606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980); 
State v. Workman. 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah App. 
1991). 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FOR FAILING TO 
DISMISS FOR CAUSE THE WIFE OF A POLICE 
OFFICER AS A JUROR. 
The Standard for review is,"a correction of 
the error" standard. See State v. Moore. 562 
P.2d 629 (Utah 1977) and State v. Brooks. 
631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981). 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT RECLUSING 
HIMSELF FROM PRESIDING OVER THE CASE WHEN AT 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING THE DEFENDANT HAD 
REQUESTED ANOTHER JUDGE, AND HIS MOTION 
GRANTED. 
The Standard for review is, "a correction of 
the error" standard. See State v. Gardner. 
789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989). 
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY TO NOT INFER THE DEFENDANT 
HAD PRIOR ASSAULT CHARGES BY THE PROSECUTOR'S 
QUESTION ON CROSS-EXAMINATION REFERRING TO 
PRIOR ASSAULTS. 
The Standard for review is, "a correction of 
the error" standard. See State v. Moore. 562 
P.2d 629 (Utah 1977) and State v. Brooks. 
631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was convicted by a jury trial on three 
counts of a four count information. The defendant's 
substantive constitutional rights, such as speedy trial, 
bias juror, insufficient evidence were violated; the judge 
should have reclused himself; prosecutorial misconduct was 
present; and improper jury instructions were given. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 14, 1994 the defendant was charged with 
four criminal violations: Count 1, Intoxication; Count 2, 
Assault by a Prisoner; Count 3, Interference with Arresting 
Officer; and Count 4, Aggravated Assault. The defendant 
appeared for his preliminary hearing on June 22, 1994, 
before the Honorable Clint Judkins. At this appearance the 
defendant made an oral motion to recluse Judge Judkins, and 
the preliminary hearing was continued and reset before a 
different judge. T. June 22, 1994 P. 3, T. Preliminary 
hearing July 15, 1994. 
On the 15th day of July, 1994, the Honorable Burton 
Harris heard evidence as it pertains to the Defendant's 
preliminary hearing and bound the Defendant over on all 
counts. T. Preliminary Hearing P. 87. On the 1st day of 
August, 1994, the Defendant appeared before the Honorable 
Ben H. Hadfield for his arraignment and entered a plea of 
not guilty. On August 8, 1994, the Honorable Ben H. 
Hadfield heard Defendant's motion to reduce bail. This 
motion was denied. T. Bail Hearing P. 9. 
On August 1, 1994, a two day jury trial was scheduled 
for August 22 and 23, 1994. On August 22, 1994, with jury 
selection about to proceed, the Defendant changed his plea 
pursuant to a plea agreement enabling the defendant to be 
immediately released from jail into the Veterans 
Administration Hospital to receive medical treatment and 
3 
alcohol recovery therapy. The defendant was released in the 
Veterans Hospital and made a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea because it was his only sure way to get the proper 
medical treatment he needed. 
The defendant has an artificial heart valve and was on 
he drug coumanin to thin his blood. He was not receiving 
the proper treatment in the Cache County jail. T. Bail 
Hearing P. 4. The Court granted his request to withdraw 
his plea having determined that plea was not free and 
voluntary. Trial was not held in this case until April 30, 
1996, which was over two years from the time the initial 
information was filed. 
The trial was presided over by the Honorable Clint 
Judkins. The defendant was found guilty of Assault by a 
Prisoner, a 3rd Degree Felony; Interference with Arresting 
Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Simple Assault, a Class 
B Misdemeanor. T. Vol 3. The Defendant completed a 90 day 
diagnostic evaluation and on September 27, 1996, was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SPEEDY TRIAL. 
II. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER, A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY, APPLYING THE STANDARD OF BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS FOR 
CAUSE THE WIFE OF A POLICE OFFICER AS A JUROR OR 
BY FAILING TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO CONDUCT 
FURTHER INQUIRY INTO HER BIAS IN CHAMBERS. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE ERRED BY NOT RECLUSING 
HIMSELF FROM PRESIDING OVER THE CASE WHEN AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING THE DEFENDANT HAD REQUESTED 
ANOTHER JUDGE, AND HIS MOTION GRANTED. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY TO NOT INFER THE DEFENDANT HAD PRIOR ASSAULT 
CONVICTIONS BY THE PROSECUTOR'S QUESTION ON CROSS-
EXAMINATION REFERRING TO PRIOR ASSAULTS. THE 
IMPROPER QUESTION BY THE PROSECUTOR PREJUDICED THE 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SPEEDY TRIAL. 
The defendant's right to a speedy trial was 
violated because the defendant did not have a trial on this 
matter until 685 days from his arrest. Article I, Section 
12, states in pertinent part: 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right...to have a speedy public trial..." 
The United States Supreme Court case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U.S. 514 (1972), sets forth criteria for determining a 
speedy trial. They are (1) length of delay, (2) reason for 
the delay, (3) defendant's assertion of the right to speedy 
trial, and (4) prejudice to defendant from the delay. 
The first criteria to be examined is the length of the 
delay. The total amount of time that lapsed from the 
defendant's arrest until his trial was 685 days. This 
lengthy delay is clearly prejudicial to the defendant. In 
State v. Lozano, 462 P.2d 710 (Utah 1969), the defendant's 
preliminary hearing was delayed for over a month, and he was 
incarcerated for over 6 months before coming to trial. The 
S 
Supreme Court of Utah reversed the conviction of the 
defendant because they determined the delay was without 
cause or excuse, was undue and oppressive and constituted 
denial of his right to a speedy trial. 
The defendant in the current case was denied a speedy 
trial. He was arrested on June 7, 1994. He was held in 
Jail without bail for eight (8) days without formal charges 
being filed. Rule 7(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure require that 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an 
arrest with or without a warrant, the person arrested shall 
be taken to the nearest available magistrate for setting of 
bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be 
filed without delay before the magistrate having 
jurisdiction over the offense. 
The information charging the defendant was not filed 
until eight (8) days after the defendant was arrested. His 
trial was not set until August 22, 1994. He was incarcerated 
for seventy-seven (77) days before his original trial date. 
An application pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure was made in this case to dismiss for lack 
of speedy trial. R. Vol 1. P. 52. The defendant pled 
guilty pursuant to a plea bargain agreement in order to be 
released from jail into the Veterans Hospital to receive 
proper medical treatment. The defendant had attempted to be 
released to the V.A. hospital at a bail hearing held August 
8, 1994. T. Bail Hearing P. 3. 
The reasons for the delay are as follows: 
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The defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea on 
September 22, 1994, and it was not ruled on until December 
5, 1994, at which time the motion was granted. R.Vol 1 P. 
56. A trial was then set for March of 1995 and then was 
continued until July 20, 1995. The Court stated at Vol 1 P. 
56, "I'm not sure why, I can't tell you why, but then it was 
continued from March to July 20th. I don't know if that was 
because of the court's calendar. I don't see any motion 
that was made at that point in time." Had the Court allowed 
the defendant proper medical treatment, he would have had 
his trial speedily. The Court delayed in ruling on his 
motion. The Court allowed the State an excessive amount of 
time to respond to the motion. Furthermore, the Court 
bumped the defendant's trial date without a reason. Then 
another year passed before the defendant was allowed to have 
a trial. 
The defendant from the very beginning requested a 
speedy trial. The defendant was denied his right to a 
speedy trial. He desired that this matter be adjudicated 
more speedily. In State v. Banks, 720 P. 2d 1380 (Utah 
1986), the Court stated that: 
There is no question that the eighteen month delay 
between the initial submission of the case and the rendition 
of the decision is sufficient to raise legitimate questions 
regarding defendant's right to a speedy disposition of his 
case. 
The defendant has been prejudiced by the delay. The 
defendant was subjected to extreme emotional turmoil that 
all defendants must face when awaiting their trial. He had 
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to wait over two years for his trial. The level of anxiety 
rose to the level that the defendant was inebriated when he 
came to court. In Barker, supra the court stated that, "The 
amorphous quality of the right also leads to the 
unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the 
indictment when the right has been deprived... such a remedy 
is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for 
a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy." The court 
should dismiss this case because of the delay. 
II. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER, A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY, APPLYING THE STANDARD OF BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
In State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1989) the 
court stated: 
We review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to 
the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
the the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
In State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (1994) the court 
stated: 
To challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, the 
defendant carries the heavy burden and must marshal all 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then show how 
that marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict even when viewed in light most favorable to the 
verdict. 
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On direct examination Deputy Lewis testified he saw the 
defendant kick Deputy Todd twice. T. Vol. 2 P. 88. "While 
Deputy Petross was doing that Robert is still kicking on the 
ground and actually kicks Deputy Todd twice in the leg area. 
I believe once was below the knee and one was somewhere up 
above the knee." Deputy Todd testified, T. Vol. 3 P. 30, 
"so he kicked me in the lower portion of the leg, upon which 
Deputy Lewis explained to him that because he!d been 
arrested he would now be charged with assault by a prisoner. 
While Deputy Lewis is telling him these things he kicked me 
again and he got up in this upper -- just above my 
genitals." 
The testimonies of the arresting officers, Paul Todd 
and Wayne Lewis, conflicted as to where Deputy Todd was 
located when he was kicked by the defendant. The defendant 
testified that he did not even kick the deputies because it 
was impossible given his hip condition. Paul Todd testified 
when Mr. Hangartner kicked him, T. Vol. 3 P. 49, "I was 
kneeling on him with his shoulder blades and I had my left 
hand on the small of his back with my right knee still 
kneeling on the ground." Officer Lewis testified, T. Vol. 2 
P. 102, "I recall I was the one up on the shoulder blades." 
The defendant testified, T. Vol. 3 P. 79, "There's no 
possible way I could have twisted at the hip" in order to 
kick the deputy Todd, who had his knees in my back. 
It would have been impossible for the defendant to kick 
Deputy Todd in the manner and location described by him if 
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Deputy Todd was kneeling on his shoulder blades. The 
deputies inconsistent testimonies impeach each other. The 
case should be remanded because the jury should not have 
convicted the defendant with this evidence. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS FOR 
CAUSE THE WIFE OF A POLICE OFFICER AS A JUROR OR 
BY FAILING TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO CONDUCT 
FURTHER INQUIRY INTO HER BIAS IN CHAMBERS. 
During the course of voir dire it became known that 
prospective juror, Ms. Purser's mother, worked in the Cache 
County Jail and juror, Lisa Budge's husband, was a police 
officer. The defendant moved to have both dismissed for 
cause. T. Vol. 1 P. 24. The Court denied the motion. T. 
Vol. 1 P. 26. The defendant requested that voir dire of 
these two be done in chambers. T. Vol. 1 P. 27. The court 
granted the request for Ms. Purser but denied it with Ms. 
Budge. T. Vol. 1 P. 27. Upon further examination of Ms. 
Purser the Court learned of her relationship with the 
witness, Paul Todd, and dismissed her. T. Vol. 1 P. 30. 
The Court should have allowed the defendant to further 
inquire into the police officer1s wife!s relationship with 
the County Attorney's office. She had indicated in voir 
dire she had met the prosecuting attorney. T. Vol. 1 P. 
17. 
In State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1995), 
the Court stated: 
The level of investigation necessary once voir dire 
reveals potential juror bias will vary from case to case and 
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is necessarily dependent on the juror's responses to the 
questions asked. 
Once the Court in the present case became aware that a 
potential juror may have some bias, it should have allowed 
the defendant an opportunity to conduct further 
investigation into this bias before denying the defendant's 
motion to dismiss for cause. The Court should have allowed 
the defendant to conduct voir dire on Ms. Budge in chambers. 
The defendant could, therefore, more accurately reflect her 
true bias as a police officer's wife and use a preemptory 
challenge to dismiss her if the Court continued to not 
dismiss her for cause. The Court should have dismissed her 
for cause. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE ERRED BY NOT RECLUSING 
HIMSELF FROM PRESIDING OVER THE CASE WHEN AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING THE DEFENDANT HAD REQUESTED 
ANOTHER JUDGE, AND HIS MOTION GRANTED. 
The defendant, prior to the preliminary hearing set for 
June 22, 1994, requested Judge Judkins recluse himself and 
not preside over the hearing. T. June 22, 1994, P.H. P. 3. 
The matter was set for July 15, 1994, and the Honorable 
Burton T. Harris presided over the preliminary hearing. T. 
P.H. P. 1. After the preliminary hearing the defendant was 
arraigned in front of Judge Hadfield on August 1, 1994. T. 
Vol. 1 P. 54. Judge Low was assigned to the trial and 
accepted the plea bargain and then granted the defendantf s 
motion to withdraw the plea. T. Vol. IP. 56. Somehow the 
case was set before Judge Clint Judkins again despite the 
re-assignment of the case. 
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In State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991), the 
Court held: 
A judge should recluse himself when his "impartiality" 
might reasonably be questioned. Utah Code of Judicial 
Conduct 3(C)(1)(b) (1981). This standard set forth by the 
Code of Judicial conduct should be given careful 
consideration by the trial judge. It may require reclusal 
in instances where no actual bias is shown. The integrity 
of the judicial system should be protected against any taint 
of suspicion. We recommend the practice that a judge 
recluse himself where there is a colorable claim of bias or 
prejudice. 
The defendant felt this judge was biased because on a 
previous case the judge revoked his probation and made him 
serve his entire sentence in jail. T. June 22, 1994 P. 3. 
The defendant has been prejudiced by this judge 
remaining on the case. The judge would not allow a one day 
continuance so that the defendant would be in a sober 
condition when the jury was selected. T. Vol. I P . 6. The 
trial was set for two days but the entire case was tried in 
one day. 
The judge further would not dismiss for cause a police 
officer's wife in a case dealing with crimes of assaulting a 
police officer and interference with arrest. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY TO NOT INFER THE DEFENDANT HAD PRIOR ASSAULT 
CONVICTIONS BY THE PROSECUTOR'S QUESTION ON CROSS-
EXAMINATION REFERRING TO PRIOR ASSAULTS. THE 
IMPROPER QUESTION BY THE PROSECUTOR PREJUDICED THE 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
The prosecutor, while conducting cross-examination of 
the defendant, asked the defendant how many times he had 
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been convicted of this charge, referring to assaults. T. 
Vol. 3 P. 101. This was improper because the prosecutor 
entered into evidence no prior judgment and conviction to 
substantiate this allegation. He created the impression in 
the minds of the jurors the defendant had been convicted of 
domestic assaults against his wife on numerous occasions. 
The court failed to correct this misimpression. No 
instruction to the jury was given to disregard the improper 
question of the prosecutor. 
In State of Utah v. Emmett. 839 P.2nd 781 (Utah 1992), 
the defendant's conviction was reversed because of the 
prosecutorfs remark during closing argument that the 
defendant had a prior forgery conviction. 
Generally the test used for determining whether a 
prosecutor's statements are improper and constitute error is 
whether the remarks "called to the jurors1 attention matters 
which they would not be justified in considering in reaching 
a verdict' Id^ at 785. 
The jurors should not consider whether the defendant 
had prior convictions for assault unless so proved by the 
prosecutor and used for impeachment. The prosecutor 
presented no evidence that the defendant had been previously 
convicted of assault. 
It is error to ask an accused a question that implies 
the existence of a prejudicial fact unless the prosecution 
can prove the existence of the fact. Otherwise the only 
limit on such a line of questioning would be the 
prosecutor!s imagination. State v. Palmer, 860 P. 2d 343 
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(Utah App. 1993) . Also in State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 
(Utah 1986), the Court held that the prosecutor's closing 
argument, which clearly, intentionally, and improperly 
stated the defendant's prior burglary conviction 
demonstrated the defendant's criminal character, constituted 
reversible error, in that argument improperly called to 
attention of the jury criminal propensity of the defendant, 
and substantive use of defendant's prior conviction added 
greatly to the likelihood that jury inferred guilty 
knowledge from character of defendant. 
Furthermore, the prosecutor erred when he asked the 
defendant on cross-examination the following: T. Vol. 3 P. 
82, "Q. Did you hear Linda testify that she saw you kicking 
at them? A. Yes. Q. You're saying that's false? A. No. 
Q. When she said you were trying to kick at somebody that's 
not false, isn't that what you just told me?" 
In State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993), the 
Court stated that questions asked regarding the veracity of 
other witnesses amounted to prosecutorial misconduct: 
The court noted this type of question is improper 
because it is argumentative and seeks information beyond the 
witness's competence. The prejudicial effect of such a 
question lies in the fact that it suggest to the jury that a 
witness is committing perjury even though there are other 
explanations for the inconsistency. In addition, it puts 
the defendant in the untenable position of commenting on the 
character and motivations of another witness who may appear 
sympathetic to the jury. 
The questions asked by the prosecutor were improper and 
highly prejudicial. The Court should have given an 
instruction correcting the errors. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be reversed. 
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